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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
CHRIS CASTILLO, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 20060811-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty by a jury in the Second District 
Court for Aggravated Assault, a third-degree felony, and Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second-degree felony. The 
Defendant entered a guilty plea on August 7, 2006, and was sentenced that 
same day to serve an indeteraiinate term of zero to five years at the Utah State 
Prison and a concurrent indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the Utah 
State Prison. The Defendant entered the plea pursuant to the case of State v. 
Seiy, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2004). 
ISSUE u . \ vFPhAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT RULED, PURSUANT TO A MOTION IN 
LIMINE, THAT IT WOULD ALLOW EVIDENCE TO BE 
PRESENTED TO THE JURY THAT A FIREARM WAS 
FOUND 172 DAYS AFTER THE ALLEGED DATE OF 
THE CRIME. 
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. "The trial court's ultimate ruling under Rule 403 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Gulbransen 106 P.3d 7345 740 (Utah 2005). This issue was preserved when 
Defendant's attorney filed a motion in limine (R. 068-071). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
11. S. CONSTITUTION 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article I Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, 
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution 
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§76-5-103, Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or 
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1 )(b) is a third degree felony. 
$76-10-503. Possession of a dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person: 
Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of dangerous 
weapons by certain persons 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in 
Section 76-3-203.5; 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony; 
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 
62A-7-101;or 
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for 
an offense which if committed by an adult would have been 
a violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5. 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony; 
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent 
for an offense which if committed by an adult would have 
been a felony; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly 
and intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or 
II controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony 
offense; 
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a 
felony offense; 
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), [FN1] or has been 
committed to a mental institution; 
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United 
States; 
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or 
4 
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of 
the United States. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, 
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have 
under his custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly 
purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, 
or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same 
time. 
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in 
another section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under this custody or control any dangerous weapon, the penalties of that 
section control. 
(6) It is an affirmative defense to a charge based on the definition in 
Subsection (l)(b)(iv) that the person was: 
(a) in possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a lawful order 
of a practitioner for use of a member of the person's household or 
for administration to an animal owned by the person or a member 
of the person's household; or 
(b) otherwise authorized by law to possess the substance. 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
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(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, 
except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division 
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS 
OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with Aggravated Assault, a 
third-degree felony, a violation of U.C.A. §76-5-103, and Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second-degree felony, a violation 
of U.C.A. §76-10-503. The Defendant pled not guilty and filed a motion in 
limine to exclude evidence found by the police some 172 days after the alleged 
assault had occurred (R. 068-071). The trial court denied this motion. (Mot. 
Hearing. Tr. 8). 
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On August 7, 2006, based on the trial court's ruling on the motion in 
limine, the Defendant entered an Alford plea to the two charges listed above, 
specifically reserving his right to appeal pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Defendant was sentenced on August 7, 2006, to 
serve an indeterminate term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison and a 
concurrent indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on August 7, 2006. A 
Notice of Appeal was filed on August 14, 2006. (R. 084-085). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The motion in limine in this case was argued on July 31,2006, with both parties 
subletting the case on stipulated facts. (R. 100). These facts indicated that on the date 
alleged, Officer Hammond responded to the area of the Wonder Bread Bakery in 
Ogden, Utah, on a report to 911 of a man with a firearm. Officer Hammond 
claimed that he observed a man fitting the description of this individual and 
began pursuing. The individual ran and kept turning around and pointing at 
Officer Hammond what he described as silver, semiautomatic pistol. (R. 
100/6). 
Another witness at the scene was an employee in the Wonder Bread 
parking lot that encountered this individual and claims that within a distance of 
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ten to fifteen feet away the individual also pointed a weapon at him which he 
also described as a silver, very large, shiny semiautomatic handgun. (R. 100/6). 
Officer Hammond lost track of the individual for approximately 20 
seconds. When he apprehended the individual, who was identified as the 
Defendant, a search was undertaken in the area of the parking lot where the 
officer saw him disappear. Despite the efforts of several police officers utilizing 
rakes and a canine search dog, as well as the efforts of several Wonder Bread 
employees, the weapon could not be located. (R. 100/2). Approximately 172 
days later a weapon that generally fit the description given by Officer 
Hammond and the other individual was found in the park strip outside the 
Wonder Bread bakery underneath some trees. (R. 100/2). All parties 
acknowledge that this area was located in a high crime region and was 
accessible to the general public. (R. 100/3). 
While examining the weapon it was determined that someone had filed off 
the serial number. Apparently the serial number was raised by CSI, and a 
search of the national weapons database revealed no information as to it being 
stolen or any information linking it to the Defendant. (R. 100/3). The 
Defendant acknowledged running from the officer, but he has consistently 
maintained that he did not possess the firearm and did not threaten anyone with 
a weapon. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court denied the Defendant's motion in limine to exclude 
evidence of the weapon discovered 172 days after the alleged crime had 
occurred. This evidence, although somewhat relevant to the charge, was highly 
prejudicial and highly suspect. The trial court should have determined that any 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
Based on the highly prejudicial effect of this evidence and the substantial 
danger that a jury would disregard the obviously tenuous link of the weapon to 
the Defendant, the Defendant elected to enter into a plea negotiation reserving 
the right to appeal this decision. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT RULED, PURSUANT TO A MOTION IN LIMINE, 
THAT IT WOULD ALLOW EVIDENCE TO BE 
PRESENTED TO THE JURY THAT A GUN WAS FOUND 
AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME 172 DAYS AFTER THE 
ALLEGED DATE OF THE CRIME. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that relevant, "evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury..." 
U.R.E. 403 (2004). When determining admissibility under Rule 403, trial 
courts must "weigh its probative value against its tendency to unfairly prejudice 
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the defendant." State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
"Unfair prejudice" means "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an 
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." State v. 
Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989). 
In State v. Maurer, 110 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), the defendant was 
convicted of second-degree murder. Thirty-eight days after the homicide the 
defendant wrote the victim's father a letter from the jail. The letter said among 
other things that the defendant was glad he killed the victim. He said that it 
"was a great feeling to watch her die." The defendant signed the letter, "The 
killer, John H. Maurer." Id. at 982. 
The defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from 
introducing the letter into evidence. The trial court denied the motion and 
found that the letter was probative of the defendant's state of mind at the time 
of the homicide and would assist the jury in determining whether the defendant 
was guilty of murder or manslaughter. Id. 
The defendant argued on appeal that even if the letter had some 
relevance, the prejudicial effect of the letter far exceeded its potential relevance 
under Rule 403. Id. at 983. Both the defendant and the State agreed that the 
central issue at the trial was the defendant's state of mind at the time he killed 
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the victim. Id. The Supreme Court found that "the balance of the letter reflects 
defendant's state of mind at the time the letter was written." Id. 
The Court recognized that it was "cognizant of the rule that the appraisal 
of the probative and prejudicial value of evidence under Rule 403 is generally 
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be upset on 
appeal absent manifest error." Id. The Court went on to state that "any 
relevance which could be found therein was greatly and clearly outweighed by 
the danger of 'unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, [and] misleading the 
jury." Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's admission of the 
entire letter was clearly erroneous. Id. 
The Supreme Court stated that "[s]ince all effective evidence is 
prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party against whom it is 
offered, prejudice which calls for exclusion is given a more specialized 
meaning:" Id. at 984. The Court then listed "an undue tendency to suggest 
decision on an improper basis, . . . such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, 
retribution or horror. Where a danger of unfair prejudice is perceived, the 
degree of likely prejudice must also be considered." Id. 
In Maurer, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he mere fact that evidence 
possesses a tendency to suggest a decision upon an improper basis does not 
require exclusion; evidence may be excluded only if the danger of unfair 
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prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the proffered 
evidence." State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury. Likewise, Article 
I Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah requires an impartial jury 
for a criminal defendant. 
These constitutional protections were addressed in the case of State v. 
Kell, 2002 UT 106 at p 0 , 61 P.3d 1019. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
Although rule 403 contains a presumption of admissibility of 
evidence, evidence that has "an unusually strong propensity to 
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury" will be deemed 
inadmissible. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). 
Inadmissible evidence may include gruesome photographs of a 
homicide victim's corpse, evidence of a rape victim's past sexual 
activities with someone other than the accused, and statistical 
evidence of matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis, such 
as witness veracity. 
(R. 100) 
In State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, % 59, 52 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2002), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that when deciding whether the risk of unfair prejudice 
under Rule 403 substantially outweighs the probative value, a number of 
factors need to be considered, including "the strength of the evidence as to the 
commission of the other crime," and "the degree to which the evidence will 
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." {Id. at *[  59) The court went on to 
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state that "[e]ven though we have applied these factors in the past to 'causes/ 
we think they are equally applicable to determine the effect of a 'wrong act' as 
described in Rule 403." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that evidence of a defendant's 
prior bad acts can violate Rule 403 due to the prejudicial effect such evidence 
may carry to a jury. In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he bases of these limitations on the admissibility 
of evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a fact finder to convict the 
accused because of bad character rather than because he is shown to be guilty 
of the offenses charged. Because of this tendency, such evidence is presumed 
prejudicial and, absent a reason for the admission of the evidence other than to 
show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded." Id. at 741 
In the case at bar, the evidence that a weapon generally fitting the 
description of a gun the two State's witnesses claimed to have seen would be 
highly prejudicial. The problems that arises in this case is that the evidence of 
the gun found 172 days after the alleged offense would almost certainly be 
given an inordinate amount of weight by a jury. Just as the evidence of prior 
convictions may be improperly utilized in obtaining a conviction, the evidence 
that a gun was found at the scene would be tempting for a jury to utilize to find 
the Defendant guilty. 
13 
The problem is that the probative value is virtually nonexistent. In the 
case a bar, the fact that a weapon generally matching the description of the 
weapon claimed to have been used at the scene was found nearly six months 
after the fact is highly suspect. The fact that it happens to match the general 
description of the witness's weapon is not unusual since hundreds of models of 
handguns are silver semiautomatic. The chance that this gun was ever held by 
the Defendant is speculative at best. The ability of the Defendant to refute the 
connection is not feasible. This is not because there is a high likelihood that the 
gun was the Defendant's, but rather because the passage of 172 days made the 
ability to fingerprint the weapon impossible. This leaves the Defendant in an 
untenable position. He could either tiy to brush off the evidence and hope the 
jury would disregard the prosecutor's efforts to link this gun to the Defendant, 
or he could attack this evidence during cross-examination of the State's 
witness. The problem with attempting a vigorous cross-examination is the 
danger that the jury may apply the old Shakespeare line, "The lady protests too 
much Methinks." (Hamlet, act 3, sc. 2, 1. 219 (1604)). In either scenario the 
Defendant faces a high probability that he will lose. 
The problem in the present case is that the presence of a gun is seminal 
to the entire case. Without a gun the prosecutors would be unable to convict the 
Defendant on the charge of possession of weapon by a restricted person. The 
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absence of a gun would also eliminate the possibility of a finding of guilt to the 
aggravated assault. 
The Defendant believes that the prejudicial effect of this evidence far 
outweighs the probative value, and therefore this Court should find that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant's motion to exclude this 
evidence. The harmfulness of this evidence is obvious, since without the gun 
the prosecution is left with a case of a couple of eyewitnesses without any 
supportive evidence. The Defendant could then argue that the absence of a gun, 
despite rigorous efforts to find the same raises reasonable doubt. The problem 
is that a jury is not sophisticated enough to separate the prejudicial effect of the 
later found weapon from the limited probative value it brings. The jury would 
not be able to recognize the fact that it would not be unusual for a gun to be 
found in the relatively large area in question during a six-month period in a 
high crime area. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not properly consider the high probability that the 
prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed any minimal probative value this 
evidence could have presented to a jury. For these reasons the trial court 
abused its discretion when it denied the Defendant's motion in limine to 
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exclude this evidence. Therefore, the Defendant's conviction should be 
reversed, and this matter should be remanded to the trial courtier-a^new trial. 
DATED this ^_ day of January 2007. 
RANDALL W. I&CHARD5 
Att omey for Appellant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGQEN p,CQUR3?TplrT pm IDT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF VJfMl) Uu* { M U ^ ^ 
AUG 1 - VQQfi 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
CHRISTOPHER SIMON CASTILLO, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051905870 FS 
Judge: ROGER S DUTSON 
Date: August 7, 2 006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: carier 
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney (s) : MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 23, 1976 
Video 
Tape Number: DO8070 6 Tape Count: 33 0 
CHARGES 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/07/2006 Guilty 
POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/07/2006 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for oral argument. The defendant is present in 
custody from the Utah State Prison with counsel. Negotiations have 
been reached. 
The defendant enters an Alford plea to count #1, F3-Aggravated 
Assault and to count 443, F2-Possession of Dngr Weap by Restricted 
Person as he intends to appeal this matter. 
State moves to dismiss all remaining charges, including the 
enhancement charge. Court grants. 
The Court accepts the Alford plea and enters the conviction. A 
plea agreement is submitted and signed in open Court. The defendant 
waives time for sentencing. Court grants and proceeds with 
Page 1 
Case No: 051905870 
Date: Aug 07, 2 006 
sentencing. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY 
RESTRICTED a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentence imposed in each count shall run concurrently with one 
another and concurrently with any ouher sentencing being served. 
Dated this day of 
KOGER Jg buTSON ^ ^ 
Distract Court Judge 
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